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1 The current interest in moral perfectionism owes much to Stanley Cavell’s works on the
constitution  of  Emersonian  perfectionism.  If  perfectionism  can  be  considered  as  an
ethical dimension already present in Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophical quest for good
life, it is important to underline the link between studies flourishing today on this issue
and what one may call the “Emerson revival.” I am struck by the similarities between this
current revival and the “Emerson boom” that happened in the German-speaking world
and the fin de siècle Austria, about a century ago. Comparing these two Emerson waves
should  lead  us  to  a  better  understanding  of  the  European  affiliation  with  moral
perfectionism, which is reflected in the importance Cavell attaches to Nietzsche.
2 In his introduction of This New Yet Unapproachable America, Cavell includes two texts, the
first  one  from  Nietzsche  and  the  second  from  Emerson,  and  develops  paths  of
philosophical  “circulation.”  He  continues  with  comments  on  an  excerpt  from  the
beginning of Genealogy of Morals, saying that he is first and foremost interested in the kind
of reorientation that Nietzsche inflicts on moral philosophy. That is: Nietzsche does not
so much wonder who we are (since we are strangers to ourselves), as where we may find
ourselves – if at all. “What chance” Nietzsche asks, “do we have of finding ourselves one
day?” For Cavell,  this question appears like an echo of Emerson’s essay “Experience,”
which starts precisely with the question: “Where do we find ourselves?”1
3 The similarity between Emerson and the greatest European immoralist shows the ethical
influence of Emerson’s works, especially as a moral experimenter, “an endless seeker” as
he depicts  himself  in “Circles.”  That  ethics  supposes a  quest,  and not  a  set  of  given
principles or values;  that it  implies that one ought to look for one’s own path, for a
personal  way  of  living  and  for  a  way  of  inheriting  a  common  culture;  that  we  are
unceasingly trying to reach a better self, a possible self – all these elements are shared by
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Emerson as well as his German reader Nietzsche and also his Austrian admirer, Robert
Musil. By looking more closely at the influence the American minister had on Nietzsche
and Musil, as well as at their ways of re-appropriating Emerson’s legacy, we can come to
outline the idea of a certain version of moral perfectionism, which would be a kind of
ethics peculiar to free spirits.
4 My goal for this paper is twofold. First, I want to point out congruencies between these
three thinkers, (congruencies that are ultimately based on Emerson’s influence on both
European thinkers) and to give an account of moral perfectionism on the basis of the
figure of “the free spirit” (freier Geist), which appears to play a crucial role in the ethical
reflections of all three of them. Secondly, I will focus on the tension between idealism and
pragmatism and the way in which it is affecting the ethics of the free spirit. Roughly
speaking, the free spirit is characterized by his or her ability to think for him – or herself
– an autonomy which also constitutes a moral deed. There is thus an ethical demand for
thoughts we are personally convinced of, rather than for thinking something because
everybody does so. Considering that expressing one’s conviction is in itself an ethical
demand, and in this regard perfectionism tends toward pragmatism. However, a further
question  arises:  if  the  personal  quest  for  a  better  self  is  at  the  heart  of  moral
perfectionism, are we not in need of an ideal of what this better self should look like? In
other words, does moral perfectionism imply at least the temptation of idealism (if not
idealism at all)? And is there not a contradiction between the practical nature of self-
affirmation and the attainment of moral ideals?
5 This  question  is  all  the  more  worth  posing  since,  as  we  know,  Emerson  is  usually
presented as a leading figure in the transcendentalist movement, which is a version of
idealism.  Nietzsche’s  view of  moral  values  has  likewise been defined as  “philological
idealism,”2 and Musil’s reflections on ethics are torn between a sharp criticism of idealism
and the constant insistence on the need for ideals in moral life. I will argue that, if the
free spirit is to be considered as a figure of moral perfectionism, we should neither take it
to be an idealist nor an anti-idealist pragmatist notion. In order to grasp the originality
and the point of moral perfectionism as a pursuit of a better future self, it is necessary to
analyze the complex role ideals play in moral practices. And I think it is very important to
differentiate anti-idealism and a complete rejection of moral ideals. I will argue that the
free spirit, while anti-idealist, remains attached to ideals that can guide one’s attempt to
personal improvement.
 
I. The Free Spirit and Moral Perfectionism
6 My point in this first section is not to give any definition of what moral perfectionism is
or should be, as I am convinced that any such attempt would be reductive regarding this
ethical dimension of our lives. I would rather propose an image of what it means to be
perfectionist  in  the sense  of  the  free  spirit.  This  figure embodies  the  exploration of
creativity in morality, and its freedom is not a natural or anthropological property, but
the result of a process of liberation. Thus, the freedom of the free spirit is never acquired,
it always remains to be achieved to such an extent that action is interwoven in a dynamic
ethics. Here, a parallel can be made between this idea of a freedom we are always looking
for and the Emersonian “unattained but attainable self.”
7 We  know  this  famous  expression,  according  to  a  moral  action  must  be  seen  as  a
renunciation of who we already are. To be an ethical agent requires that we give up our
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often comfortable  and secure  place,  our  ready-made or  realized self,  in  the  hope of
another self, which is possible (attainable). There is a strong recommendation in these
words of leaving reality to discover a possible self and a possible way of living, at the risk
of loosing oneself. This preference for possibility is also at stake in a passage Cavell quotes
from Nietzsche about a call for the unknown, for leaving our place in order to try to find
ourselves. The free spirit has the strength to abandon his habits, his social and moral
inherited values. It is not a matter of bringing a new foundation or of replacing an older
order by a new one; the point is rather to abandon the very idea of grounds and to re-
appropriate one’s culture in a critical and personal way. This is the very challenge of the
free spirit: not to rebuild morality, but rather to learn to think on one’s own.
8 It is this capacity that defines the free spirit in Nietzsche’s Human, All Too Human, when he
says :
We call ‘free spirit’ the one who thinks in a different way from what he is expected
to do regarding his origin, his milieu, his condition and his position, or regarding
the prevailing opinions of his time.3
9 The autonomy of one’s thought presupposes the difference between the real  and the
possible, hence the capacity to be able to see what is possible beyond what is real, beyond
social conventions and external determinations. The thing is that, according to Nietzsche,
most of us are used to thinking in a realistic way, whereby “realistic” means a poor
dependence on the already-made. To be realistic, in this sense, means to be conservative
and to avoid doing something different if it runs the risk of not fitting into our real world,
or of remaining too far removed from ordinary life. This kind of inertia is the opposite of
the feeling of self-dissatisfaction that drives the free spirit. The free spirit is motivated by
the conviction that a better world and a better self are possible. Thus, the free spirit is
accurately defined by Musil as the man of possibility.
10 Indeed,  Musil’s  anthropological  typology is  rooted in  the  Enlightenment’s  traditional
interest in possibility and utopia. I shall discuss the link between idealism and this sense
of possibility in the next sections. What I want to point out now is the distinction Musil
makes  in  his  novel  between  two  types  of  men:  the  man  of  reality  and  the man  of
possibility. Regarding this second type, he writes in The Man without Qualities:
The man who is endowed with [the sense of possibility] won’t say, for instance: here
happened, will happen, must happen such and such things; but he’ll imagine: here
could, should happen such and such things; and when he’s told that a thing is just
like it is, he thinks that it could be just as well different. Then, we could simply
define the sense of possibility as the faculty to think everything that could be “as
well,” and not to attach more importance to what is than to what is not.4
11 It is striking that Musil uses Emerson’s characterization of the free spirit to describe this
man of possibility (who is also the man without qualities after whom the novel is named).
Plenty of  commentators  have underlined the proximity  of  Musil’s  man of  possibility
(named Ulrich in the novel) and Nietzche’s freier Geist, without, however, taking the next
step, which would lead to Emerson. The connection with Nietzsche appears explicitly in
the novel, in a passage in which Ulrich is having a conversation on morality with his
sister Agathe. This is an amazing moment when the couple reflects on Ulrich’s suggestion
of the “ethics of the next step.” This conception takes ethics to be a dynamic process,
stressing the morality of the agent rather than that of the action and taking account of
his motives rather than the practical results of his actions. In this ethical perspective,
rules are not the determinants of action, because they are too general to be operative in
every particular case. There is no social or stable criterion for acting, so that Ulrich is
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advocating for “moral robbers,” who are defying social morality in order to defend their
sense  of  truthfulness  and  their  convictions.  Suppressing  the  double  constraint  of
coherence and social conformity, what matters is the next step; not what has been done
or real past deeds are decisive, but a possible future action is the real concern.
12 It is in this context that Ulrich refers to Nietzsche’s freier Geist.5 From what has just been
said, one could think that Nietzsche’s immoralism should be invoked in order to sustain
the ethics  of  the next step as a morality without external  groundings.  In a startling
reversal, this invocation is introduced as an answer and, moreover, as a way of limiting
Agathe’s boldness when she discusses the ethics of the next step. Taking her brother at
his words, and testing his sympathy for “moral robbers” and Dostoievskyan criminals,
she asks “What if it was me committing a murder?” In asking this question, she points out
the idealistic tendency of her brother’s notion of ethical possibility in a very subtle way.
Thus, she brings their moral concerns back to reality in a very pragmatic way: What if she
were killing her husband?
13 In this attempt to test the practicability of immoralism, Agathe compels her brother to
reconsider his own discourse on ethics. Here, the reference to Nietzsche will help him to
defend  a  more  pragmatic  vision  of  the  free  spirit:  “Nietzsche  himself,”  Ulrich  says,
“enjoins free spirits to observe certain outward rules for the sake of their inner freedom.”
6 In this scene, Nietzsche becomes the guarantor of moral order! The difficulty is to reach
such a compromise between outward social morality and inner personal creative ethics,
or, in other words, to imagine new possibilities of acting in the limits of social agreement.
It is another way of expressing the tension I have already evoked between the ideal and
the real,  since the sense of  possibility appears as an idealistic  movement of  thought
whereas social rules embody the reality of our social practices.
14 In  another  conversation between brother  and sister,  which is  described a  few pages
before this scene, Ulrich had already quoted Emerson, without mentioning his name, in
order to show the difficulty of immoralism and his demand that immoralism should be
another  morality,  a  stronger  one  and  not  relativism.  The  quotation  is  in  fact  from
“Circles,” where Emerson writes:
“The virtues of society are vices of the saint.”7
15 This statement distinguishes between social values and a higher morality which is an
ideal horizon at this point of the reflection. When Agathe speaks of killing her husband,
she tries to rely on Emerson’s quotation, and her justification consists in considering her
murder as an antisocial action, not an immoral one. In order to ward off Agathe’s appeal
to murder, Ulrich feels the need to defends himself by distancing himself from Emerson:
“I didn’t say that the vices of society were virtues of the saint!”
16 This reversal proves his sensibility to moral limits and the refusal to (mis-)understand
immoralism as a complete reversal of traditional values. Being a free spirit does not mean
that one should think murder is good. A mere reversal would be far too easy and lead to
absurdities. True immoralism does not consist in rejecting all actual values, but in being
able to re-appropriate these values through a critical reflection and to envision a higher
morality, free from compromises. In this sense, the free spirit is also able to account for
the personal conflict between, on the one hand, his inner conviction and its demand for
truthfulness and, on the other, conformity and its propensity to obey moral and social
rules.
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17 To go deeper into the filiation between Musil, Nietzsche and Emerson, we must also relate
Nietzsche’s notion of the freier Geist to Emerson, who is the first to employ the notion of
the free spirit. Indeed, I am convinced that Nietzsche’s idea of freier Geist was modeled on
and is a refinement of Emerson’s original conception of the “free spirit,” which, Emerson
tells us,  “sympathizes not only with the actual  form, but with the power or possible
forms.”
18 This is, I think, the very key to our understanding of the link between ethics and the
sense of  possibility  in  Nietzsche and Musil,  who appear  to  have taken this  sentence
seriously and to have developed it  in personal  and remarkable ways.  Other passages
support this idea of the existence of two types of men, one of which is feeble-minded,
corresponding to Nietzsche’s slave and Musil’s man of reality, while the other is gifted
with moral strength and power, like Nietzsche’s master or Musil’s man of possibility.
Thus, Emerson writes also in his essay Power: “The feeble man can see the farms that are
fenced and tilled, the houses that are built. The strong man sees the possible houses and
farms.”8
19 This  again suggests  that  Emerson’s  influence on Nietzsche and Musil’s  conception of
immoralism as an ethical implementation of the powerful sense of possibility is not to be
underrated. Immoralism is neither conceived as moral relativism nor as cruelty or a total
absence of morality.  Instead,  it  is  “proving us,” as Musil  has it,  “that life works also
differently.”9 It is in this denial of an absolute approach to any existing morality that the
sense of possibility constitutes an ethical power. It is the power to change the real in
order to reach the “unattained, but attainable self.”
 
II. Emerson: “The Ideal is the Real”
20 According to Emerson, the capacity to think on one’s own corresponds to what he calls
“self-reliance,” the power to rely on what one is and thinks. Thus, Emerson exhorts us in
his essay entitled Self-Reliance:
“Trust thyself! Every heart vibrates to that iron string.”10
21 To trust oneself requires that one frees oneself from social conformity and that one is
capable of relying on one’s imagination of possible ways of living. This exhortation is
made possible by the discovery of the very nature of reality. Reality is not a constraining
prison, as Emerson seems to depict it in his essay Fate. If we are helpless in the face of
natural forces that constitute our destiny, we can recover power and freedom only by
adopting another conception of  the real.  Indeed,  Emerson already wrote in his  early
lectures: “The Ideal is the Real. The Actual is but the apparent and the Temporary.”11
22 This identity between the ideal and the real is surprising in many ways. First, it seems to
obscure the deep hiatus between ideality and reality in so far as the proper definition of
ideality supposes that it is not sensible, that it does not belong to our perceptual world.
Shall  we read this identification as a sign of Emerson’s idealism, a landmark concept
expressing  his  wish  to  order  and  conceive  reality  according  to  ideals?  One  has  to
acknowledge that Emerson’s resort to the ideal is very subtle and has to be distinguished
from philosophical idealism such as Kant’s or Hegel’s. If we link this quotation to several
essays written in the 1840s, for instance Experience or Nominalist and Realist, we can take
Emerson to be saying that the real is never given, that it is always to be looked for, but
not only as part of a quest for truth about the world. His point is rather to arouse our
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attention to the fact that the real, since it is never given, might be shaped by us – shaped
by our ideals.
23 Far from defending a kind of Platonic metaphysical realism, then, Emerson is tackling the
idea that immediate experience is more important than possible experience. We seem to
prefer an ontology of the actual to one of the possible. Emerson shows that the important
difference to be made is not between the real and the possible, but rather between the
actual reality and the possible one. From this point of view, the role of the ideal is neither
to move us away from reality nor to cast reality in an idealistic mold, but to revive the
power of our imagination by proposing ideas of a possible world (and of a possible self).
Thus, the point is not to choose between an ideal world and a real one, but to find how to
realize ideals in our practical life.
24 Indeed,  the  representation  of  an  ideal  world  different  from  the  one  we  inhabit  is
explicitly rejected by Emerson in his late works. In his journals, for example, he evokes
one of his conversation with his friend Sampson Reed:
In town I also talked with Sampson Reed, of Swedenborg and the rest. “It is not so
in your experience, but it is so in the other world.” “Other world?” I reply, “there is
no other world; here or nowhere is the whole fact […]”12
25 This refusal to confine ideals in a second other world indicates an evolution in Emerson’s
thought from transcendentalism to pragmatism. If it makes sense to hold on to ideals
within a pragmatic context, it is only to the extent that they have an effect on our world.
The purpose seems in fact to transform reality through ideals; Emerson speaks in this
regard of “the transformation of genius into a practical power.”13 Likewise,  the “true
romance which the world exists to realize” refers to the imagination of possibility, in the
Emersonian version of idealism. This transformation is not obvious. Indeed, not all our
ideals can be carried out, and too often, theoretical boldness leads to ideals which are
deprived of the slightest practical value. The idealist must also be a realist, otherwise
ideals will remain empty dreams.
26 This  transformation  requires  experimentation  and  expression.  Experimentation  is
needed  to  explore  the  imaginative  area  of  possibilities.  The  renunciation  of  secure
certitudes is not necessarily painful, since it also constitutes a liberation and opens onto
new possibilities. In Circles Emerson depicts himself as an experimenter, saying:
I  unsettle  all  things.  No  facts  are  to  me  sacred;  none  are  profane;  I  simply
experiment, an endless seeker, with no Past at my back.14
27 Ethics  appears  in  this  quotation  as  an  endless  quest,  bringing  morals  into  play
unceasingly, confronting ideals with particular contexts. Like the real,  ethics is never
given, never acquired, always to seek and to find through attention and imagination. In
this sense, ethics is itself an experimentation without the purpose of reaching absolute
principles. The fact that no virtue should be taken as definitive is not something negative,
since it makes it possible to imagine different possibilities without being censored by
sacred moral values.
28 This idea is also related to one of the elements which constitutes Emerson’s skepticism :
the uncertainty of our perception of reality,  and therefore,  our lack of knowledge of
reality.  This  issue has been brilliantly developed by David Robinson.  Commenting on
Emerson’s Experience, he argues:
The problem of not knowing, stated earlier as threatened perception, has become
the solution of not knowing, stated now as ‘inscrutinable possibility.’15
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29 This indicates that our relationship to the world is problematic in two ways: first, because
our attachment to reality through habits prevents us from imagining how to change and
to improve reality; second, because our lack of knowledge of reality is also an obstacle to
our capacity of acting in a blurred and uncertain world. The limits of our knowledge,
instead of sustaining skepticism, is also a means to overcome our deficient link to reality
by the sense of possibility, even if skepticism persists through this sense insofar as it
tackles ideals and their articulation to our practices.
30 To go further, we can assert that the difficulty of this sense of possibility relies on the fact
that the imagination of new possibilities of living can only develop from real experiences,
because of the risk of abandoning the real ground. It is not easy to get free from social
conventions and actual habits, and at the same time to keep a sense of what is realizable.
The aim of the Emersonian free spirit must not be confounded with “manipular attempts
to realize the world of  thought”16 which would be an expression of  idealism proper.
Instead of elaborating a theoretical yet unattainable world (idealism), the free spirit uses
his  culture  and his  past  as  a  springboard  to  imagine  possibilities  which will  not  be
disconnected from reality.
Emerson’s  criticism  of  idealism  can  also  be  grasped  in  his  descriptions  of
contemporary utopian experimentations such as Fruitlands or Brook Farm. When
he comments on his friends’ Lane and Alcott plan to establish a communitarian
farm,  Emerson  elaborates  on  the  very  problem  of  idealism.  Indeed,  idealism  is
initially presented as a hypocritical attitude replacing action and the courage to act
by  beautiful  speeches  and theories.  But  this  is  not  exactly  the problem.  Let  us
remember what Emerson says when he confesses his own withdrawal in Fruitlands
project: “I am always insincere, as always knowing there are other moods.”17
31 Emerson’s insincerity must not be seen as a betrayal  of  his  ideals,  but rather as the
expression  of  his  skepticism  towards  ideals  which  seem  far  too  theoretical  and
disconnected from reality. Mistrusting theory also as a flipside, namely that one puts
one’s trust in the evanescent experience. Attention to experience and its changes results
in a change in mood, say when enthusiasm is replaced by skepticism. Theories are often
too general and unable to fit into the particularity of changing experience. Because Lane’s
and Alcott’s utopia appears as too theoretical, it is doomed to fail. It was already the case
with Brook Farm. In Experience, Emerson goes back over this failed reformation attempt
and indicates to what extent skeptical doubt is necessary for the pursuit of ideals, insofar
as it reminds the demand for practicability:
If a man should consider the nicety of the passage of a piece of bread down his
throat, he would starve. At Education-Farm, the noblest theory of life sat on the
noblest  figures  of  young men and maidens,  quite  powerless  and melancholy.  It
would not rake or pitch a ton of hay; it would not rub down a horse; and the men
and maidens it left pale and hungry.18
32 Emerson’s insincerity thus sheds a light on the initial identity between the ideal and the
real. This identification must be understood through the skeptical imperative that ideals
should be attached to practical values and can be realized in our world. Insincerity is not
a renunciation to ideals, but a refusal of pure theories unable to deal with our world. In
this  perspective,  the  ideal  and  the  real  are  strongly  interlinked,  since  the  first  is
necessary to change the second,  and the second is  the only world we live in,  which
includes limits that the sense of possibility must take into account.
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III. Nietzsche, Self-Knowledge and Idealism
33 While thinking of self-improvement as a central element of moral perfectionism, one
could evoke Nietzsche’s superman (Übermensch) which seems to provide such an image of
a better self. Consider on the one hand, the implication of the concept of melioration in
the “superman,” and on the other hand, Cavell’s references to Nietzsche as a figure of
moral perfectionism that gives rise to controversy about the potentially elitist nature of
perfectionism. I shall consider whether Nietzsche’s free spirit corresponds to the elitist
image of the superman. I would argue that the free spirit is another, more accessible
figure than the mysterious superman and that it would be misleading to confound these
two different images. To spur the traces of Nietzsche’s reading of Emerson, is particularly
fruitful in order to grasp the place of the free spirit in his philosophy. It also helps explain
his continuous challenge to articulate ideals and practices and his rejection of the dualist
opposition (distinction) between theory and practice.
34 The free spirit appears most explicitly in Human, All Too Human, a book dedicated to “free
spirits.”19 Commenting on this work in Ecce Homo, he writes :
Human, All Too Human is the monument reminding a crisis. It is entitled a book for
free spirits: almost each of its sentences expresses a victory – by it, I’ve freed myself
from what is not involved in my nature. Is not involved, for instance, idealism.20
35 This remark calls attention to the fact that, in order to understand what a free spirit is,
one  should  connect  it  with  the  criticism  of  idealism  rather  than  with  the  idea  of
excellence and the promotion of virtues which are at stake in the superman’s figure.
Furthermore, Cavell’s quotation in its turn refers to this issue of idealism, insofar as it
begins like that: “We are strangers to ourselves.” Indeed, this estrangement reveals the
contradiction between the need for knowledge, which is also typical of the philosopher,
and a lack of self-knowledge. How can we claim truth and knowledge whereas we do not
even possess this primary knowledge of ourselves? This paradox is one possible way of
making the free spirit  emerge,  since he appears  as  the bearer  of  the quest  for  self-
knowledge.
36 Self-knowledge  is  the  purpose  of  the  free  spirit,  which  is  to  say  that  he  is  not  as
concerned with truth as with probity and truthfulness. He is interested in being aware of
his own ideas,  conceptions,  preferences,  and his problem is to develop them without
being influenced by prevailing opinions and social  norms.  Nietzsche’s  analysis  of  the
philosophical knowledge impulse shows that philosophers aim at gathering the variety of
experiences, in all their multiplicity and evanescence, in an ideal unity. And they are
doing this  by building systems which sort  out  elements of  reality,  abandoning those
elements which resist being integrated in the system. In other words, the philosophical
task consists in reducing the unknown to the already-known. This is the proper task of
idealism: it reduces reality to an ideal order, a product of thought.
37 Thus, idealism is an attempt to flee from reality, to ignore the unknown and to reject
what Nietzsche also calls the tragic dimension of life: the conflict between contradictory
impulses which resist unification. Unlike the idealist philosopher, the free spirit is the
one who is able to recognize both this conflict and its passionate nature. Moreover, he is
looking for the unknown, accepting the multiplicity of experience beyond the frame of
our  concepts  and  the  possibility  of  different  conceptual  perspectives.  This  open-
mindedness leads him to surpass himself; a movement which characterizes perfectionism
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and presupposes  the experience of  loosing the realized self  in  order  to look for  the
possible,  still  unknown  self.  On  this  point,  Nietzsche  is  very  close  to  Emersonian
perfectionism,  a  moral  quest  based on the  discovery of  unimagined aspects  of  one’s
personality.
38 Thus, the free spirit is defined as a realist. Instead of looking for an ideal perfection, or
the achievement of his best qualities and virtues, he is focusing on the reality of his own
tendencies and plurality of affects. By doing this, he stops avoiding life. The emphasis on
life  prevents  us  from an idealistic  understanding of  perfectionism here:  if  there is  a
demand for  self  improvement,  it does  not  consist  in  the  elaboration  on  an  ideal  of
perfection and the subsequent attempt to reach it.  On the contrary, the fundamental
issue concerns the gap between thought and life, between the ideal and the real, and the
aim of the free spirit is to bridge it. Now, according to Nietzsche, life is engaging our body
and a range of passions and interlinked and conflicting affects.
39 Idealism is precisely the tendency to forget this bodily dimension of ours while it is in fact
the very origin of our ideals and of our ways of thinking. In the genealogical perspective,
ideals  are  “the distorted expressions  of  our  body’s  desire,”21 a  form of  our  affective
impulses which aims at the same time at making this bodily origin disappear. To the
extent that these impulses are anchored in personal preferences and subjectivity, one can
understand  why  Nietzsche  also  considers  ideals  as  values:  they  constitute  various
evaluations, and evaluation is in itself a way of affirming one’s preference, the expression
of  one’s  prevailing relationship of  one’s  body with life.  The link between ideals  and
practices is reinforced in this conception of ideals as expressive of evaluations originated
in our corporal dimension. As Nietzsche writes:
Then comes the upper stage: the attempt to create an ideal (ein Ideal dichten). This
precedes even the upper stage: precisely to live this ideal.22
40 The tragic aspect of our condition not only consists in the tension between different
impulses at the basis of our thinking about the world, but also in the tension between
thought (ideal) and life. At his point, the criticism against idealism opens up onto a strong
double demand: first, the demand that life should be thought, grasped by our concepts
and our language; second, the demand that ideals should be lived in practice. In my view,
Nietzsche is  not  totally  rejecting idealism (or  philosophy);  he  is  rather  advocating a
reciprocal conversion of thought and body (actions and affects).  In this view, we can
remember Nietzsche’s definition of ideals as “the coded language of affects”
(Zeichnensprache der Affekte).23
41 If we sum up Nietzsche’s criticism against idealism, we can see that it is, on the one hand,
very forcefully acting against metaphysics and systematization in philosophy, but also, on
the other hand, involved in the movement of perfectionism as a quest related to self-
knowledge.  Indeed,  by  underlining  the  affective  origin  of  ideals  and  of  everyone’s
perspective, Nietzsche is also propagating a form of soul-searching. His own point of view
is anchored in a personal impulse. The power of his analysis is this deep lucidity, the
acceptance of  the link between his own way of  thinking and his affects, from which
results  a  deep  self-reliance,  the  capacity  to  trust  one’s  body,  preferences,  and
experiences,  while acknowledging that these elements are not absolute and universal
producers of truth.
42 In face of this modesty and self-awareness of Nietzsche, Heinz Wismann suggested to
refer to his notion of idealism as a “philological idealism” in order to account for both
Nietzsche’s  sharp  criticism of  idealism and  his  recognition  of  the  status  of  his  own
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assertions:  these  are  also  rooted  in  an  idiosyncratic  life  of  affects,  biased  by  this
instinctive ground, irremediably subjective. That is why the issue of idealism leads him to
re-evaluate the priority given to “truth” in regards of truthfulness. The need for truth
corresponds  to  a  certain  impulse  and  a  particular  (reductionist)  relation  to  reality,
whereas truthfulness indicates the relation to one’s own preferences and probity, which
do not require us to reject ideals, but instead to live them, to realize them in our life. The
issues of truth and objectivity do not disappear, but they are not the topics Nietzsche is
most interested in. He is concerned instead with our way of being truthful to our affective
motives, like the free spirit who has been able to free himself from his own impulses by
accepting them and the tendency to ignore them.
43 This perceptiveness is the ground of the next step to experiment, The example of free
spirits offered by Nietzsche is Christopher Columbus, the great symbol of the quest for
the unknown. The experiment (Versuch) characterizes the way of living like a free spirit.
The genealogical approach continues its work of mining culture and prejudices, and
allows the free spirit to explore step by step the unknown without preconceived ideas,
being open to adventure and new discoveries. The experimental method is also a return
to reality, to the solid world of our Erlebnisse. The scientific metaphor is not innocent: it
expresses Nietzsche’s  attachment and admiration for science as  model  of  intellectual
probity and truthfulness.
44 Nietzsche’s philosophy of exploration and his criticism of idealism are two sides of the
same conception of ethics, understood as intellectual integrity and a search for ourselves.
The  purpose  is still  the  attainment  of  knowledge,  but  in  the  specific  form  of  self-
knowledge  that  requires  us  to  overcome  the  dualism  opposing  ideal  and  life.  Self-
knowledge implies the exploration of oneself, including one’s body, and to acknowledge
one’s preferences and concerns. It involves a certain way of thinking by elaborating ideals
conceived as being anchored in passions, and a certain way of living by trying to realize
these  ideals  or  to  imagine  other  ones.  In  this  view,  exploring  reality  overlaps  with
imagining  possibility.  Free  spirits  find  their  own  paths  by  relying  on  their  past
experiences as well as by being open to the adventure into the unknown.
 
IV. Musil, “An Idealist Without Idealism”
45 Robert Musil, who had no shame in confessing that he had strongly been influenced by
both  Emerson  and  Nietzsche,  developed  a  version  of  the  free  spirit  which  tries  to
overcome the hiatus between the ideal and the real. My argument is that in the third
section of the novel, Musil’s main character Ulrich represents the free spirit and that his
story  offers  an  image  of  moral  perfectionism.  In  The  Man  without  Qualities,  the
mathematician  Ulrich  is  confronted  with  a  painful  experience:  the  failure  of  the
successive utopia he has imagined. So, at the end of the second section of the novel, he is
increasingly concerned with the urgency to bridge the gap between ideals and reality, the
failure of which continues to threaten the possibility of action and of improvement. The
plot can be summarized as follows: Ulrich wishes that human beings would act more
fairly and to the purpose of a better life. But this desire comes up against the unrealizable
nature of many ideals of a good life, or, on the contrary, against a lack of ideals in our
practical lives From then on, the aim of the moralist Ulrich is to find ideals which are
compatible with reality. This is the role of the sense of possibility.
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46 Trying to satisfy this requisite, Ulrich does not suggest an ideal system which would be
better than the others. His change is not of a theoretical nature, but of a practical one: he
adopts another attitude. This attitude consists in being open to the unexpected, to the
unknown, and in acting step by step. The meeting with his sister brings an end to the
theoretical moment of his life. He concludes that if he wants a fairer life, he has to find
one himself: to find a personal way of being which is based on conviction. Here again, we
can read Musil’s interest in conviction as being closely related to his reading of Emerson’s
self-reliance. The ideal we are thus offered is to do only what we are convinced of, to stop
doing anything which would be insignificant for us. In other words, Musil’s motto could
be “Never act without conviction.”
47 The notion of conviction not only concerns our actions, but also our relation to ourselves.
To act convincingly presupposes that we know ourselves well enough to be sure of the
motives  and  meanings  of  our  actions.  Furthermore,  this  self-knowledge  includes
dissatisfaction with these motives and meanings: it is because I am not satisfied with what
I did, wished or said, that I am trying to be different and to change myself by exploring
ways of being myself which could be more compatible with my own changing idea of this
“better self.”
48 From this point of view we can examine Musil’s rejection of idealism as the other side of
his  development  of  moral  perfectionism.  Indeed,  Musil  criticizes  idealism insofar  as
idealism constitutes a metaphysical flight from reality. Idealism suggests ideals that are
always unattainable and to which we can only aspire. Instead of living our ideals, we live for
ideals  which  remain  confined in  the  world  of  our  thought.  Musil  employs  the  term
“pragmatism” to refer to the cynical activism which is only concerned with the results,
the  performance  of  action,  rather  than  its  motives,  its  value.  It  is  a  kind  of  rough
consequentialism.
49 A more positive notion of pragmatism emerges in the novel when Ulrich appears as a
perfectionist concerned with the question how to live. The rejection of idealism opens up
the ideal of motivation or conviction. This ideal is not unrealizable and it is rooted in the
subjective and affective dimension of individual morality. Self-improvement is depicted
as a search for what is important and makes sense. Self-transformation thus implies an
exploration of this personal universe of motives and of our capacity to make sense of
anything. That is why we can gain motivation only step by step, according to our capacity
to be aware of reality, to make sense of our experience, to imagine possible motives and
meanings.  In  the  novel,  this  attempt  to  act  with  conviction is  realized  step  by  step
through Ulrich’s conversations with Agathe, through their mutual trust, friendship and
love. This itinerary to find who one can be includes a part of experiments and failures,
which are inseparable from our practices. It must be pursued in the constant renewing of
conviction. In Ulrich’s words: “Faith must not be an hour old!”24
50 Ideals, then, are nothing less than the representations of the self we could and would like
to be. They are necessary for self-transformation since they constitute the temporary
step to reach. If one needs self-knowledge in order to make clear who one wants to be or
where to be in regard of the previous generation and of one’s culture, self-transformation
is  also  sustaining  this  knowledge.  Abandoning  ideals  would  mean  abandoning  self-
improvement and remaining the same, keeping one’s realized self. It is because he cannot
bear  this  idea  of  moral  stagnation  and  conservatism  that  Musil  calls  for  self-
transformation through conviction and re-appropriates the romantic and Nietzschean
motto: “Become who you are!” His character in the novel is finally depicted as “an idealist
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without idealism,”25 a device which expresses that the reject of metaphysical idealism is
accompanied by the attachment to ideals as representations of a possible better self.
 
V. Conclusion
51 The underestimated filiation between Emerson, Nietzsche, and Musil is peculiarly fruitful
when it comes to the issue of moral perfectionism and its place in the debate opposing
idealism and pragmatism in the 21th century. As the image of a peculiar type of man, the
free spirit constitutes a way of depicting what moral perfectionism could look like and
how it is related to ideals. The common ground of these three versions of the free spirit
consists  essentially  in  the  notion  of  possibility.  Possibility,  usually  seen  as  a  logical
concept in philosophy,  is  given an ethical  importance.  As such,  it  indicates a certain
moral strength – call it self-reliance, probity, or conviction – which allows the individual
to explore even the most obscure parts him or her-self, to be critical of oneself, and to
accept the adventure of leaving this unsatisfied self and to search for a possible better
one.
52 In this view, the sense of possibility is rather an ethical faculty than a purely intellectual
power, since it involves self-criticism, accuracy, and imagination. But it makes sense only
if it has practical effect, especially the effect of leading one to become who one is. Yet the
ability to think on one’s own, while already conceived by our three thinkers as a moral
act,  is  not  in  itself  sufficient;  their  very  purpose  is  not  only  the  autonomy of  one’s
thought, but the power to act according to one’s own thought. This point allows us to
argue that moral perfectionism is pragmatic insofar as it demands practical effects and
actions. But this pragmatist orientation, because it is threatened by cynical activism or
conformity,  must  be  guided  by  personal  ideals  conveying  the  image  of  a  better
“unattained, but attainable” self.
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ABSTRACTS
My goal for this paper is twofold. First, I want to point out congruencies between these three
thinkers: Emerson, Nietzsche and Musil. Such congruencies are ultimately based on Emerson’s
influence on both European thinkers and lead to an account of moral perfectionism based on the
figure  of  “the  free  spirit”  (freier  Geist),  which  appears  to  play  a  crucial  role  in  the  ethical
reflections  of all  three  of  them.  Secondly,  I  will  focus  on the  tension  between idealism and
pragmatism and the way in which it is affecting the ethics of the free spirit.
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